From: | Barbara Legate <blegate@legate.ca> |
To: | DAVID CHEIFETZ <davidcheifetz@rogers.com> |
obligations@uwo.ca | |
Date: | 22/06/2010 21:08:53 UTC |
Subject: | RE: ODG - Liebig v Guelph General et al Ont CA |
I don’t think it is that dire David.
What it stands for is that this case does not undergo an Anns analysis because it is an existing duty.
I have exhaustively reviewed jurisprudence in Canada, and surprise surprise, this
is the first time an appellate court has said there is such a duty ( as opposed
to assume there is one without stating that), at least in reported decisions.
The other interesting thing is that, apart
from Mustapha, the SCC had not
made a clear statement that the Anns
analysis was not to be done, as opposed to “not necessary”, in a
case where there is an existing or analogous cause of action; I think the OCA
has finally stated that it is not to be done, period. (See for eg the court’s
analysis in Commiso which adopts
the trial judge, who does a sort of Anns
analysis and decides that he has to move on to the policy analysis. He does and
determines that there was no policy against the cause of action. It was a bit
confused in the past)
On the duty issue, I argued that Fullowka has thrown cold water on the use
of conflicting duties as a policy reason to avoid an otherwise proximate relationship
giving rise to a duty, in cases of litigation between private parties. If the court had been inclined to
undertake a Cooper-Anns analysis,
then I argued that Paxton
and Bovingdon would have been
differently decided had the courts had the benefit of Fullowka. So, if I asked for a sweeping
statement, that would be it, but only if I lost on the Cooper-Anns argument. Which, of course, I did
not.
So you are right about one thing, I will
indeed get costs.
From:
DAVID CHEIFETZ [mailto:davidcheifetz@rogers.com]
Sent: June-22-10 11:19 AM
To: Barbara Legate;
obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Re: ODG - Liebig v Guelph
General et al
Barb,
The decision also
1. isn't going to be any sort of precedent for any
other case - paras. 16 and 17; and.
2. correctly understood, isn't even a precedent for or
against the ultimate decisions next time somebody attempts to argue that
there should be no actionable duty in respect of injury sustained,
before birth, by an infant who is born alive.
The least of the reasons for that is para. 17, and the first
part of the first sentence of para. 18, both of which I should have included in
the earlier message:
[17] It is undesirable for us to do so since all that we have before us is a sparse record consisting only of the pleadings in what, in law, amounts to a routine case easily decided on the basis of a well-established principle.
[18] Our refusal to engage in making the kind of sweeping statements requested by the parties ...
It seems to me, with respect, that while the result
isn't pyrrhic for you - you will get costs, I trust - and the
CMPA refusal was (well, except for the fact of the lawyers' billings, but we
don't have to go there); nonetheless, it's still a Shakespearean
sound and fury consequence for you. There's this. You've no guarantee that
the law won't change in some way harmful to your client before
the trial, perhaps on a motion with a better record. I concede that that's
unlikely but, then, even the House of Lords recently agreed that one should
never say never.
Reasonable people can and will differ, I'm sure.
Cheers,
From: DAVID
CHEIFETZ <davidcheifetz@rogers.com>
To: Barbara Legate
<blegate@legate.ca>; obligations@uwo.ca
Sent: Tue, June 22, 2010 9:14:09
AM
Subject: Re: Liebig v Guelph
General et al
Barb:
In this particular case, on the facts of this case paras.
14-16, and other places. But, the ONCA specifically said there might
be cases were a fetus born alive cannot sue in
[14] We recognize that, in the future, the reasoning in Bovingdon and Paxton may be brought to bear in other cases involving post-conception negligence. Indeed, in written and oral argument, counsel ventured opinions on a wide range of issues and possible scenarios extending well beyond the narrow compass of the facts of this case.
[15] However, in our view, it is neither necessary nor desirable for this court in this case to attempt to set out comprehensively the duties owed and the potential liability of heath care providers in relation to all manner of injuries to infants arising from negligence before birth.
[16] It is unnecessary as the facts of this case fall within the familiar and well-established category of labour and delivery cases where it has never been seriously questioned that negligent health care providers are liable. As we can decide this case on the basis of this body of case law, we need not venture into less familiar territory or speculate as to how the law might evolve with respect to other scenarios.
You got what you need. Congrats. OTLA didn't get the general
declration it wanted. On the other hand, the CMPA didn't get what it
seemingly wanted, in the specific or the general.
Cheers,
David
From: Barbara
Legate <blegate@legate.ca>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Sent: Tue, June 22, 2010 8:13:31
AM
Subject: Liebig v Guelph General
et al
Fetus born alive can still sue in
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2010/june/2010ONCA0450.htm
No Cooper-Anns analysis needed for a “garden
variety” claim.
Cheers
Barb
From: Barbara
Legate <blegate@legate.ca>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Sent: Tue, June 22, 2010 8:13:31
AM
Subject: Liebig v Guelph General
et al
Fetus born alive can still sue in
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2010/june/2010ONCA0450.htm
No Cooper-Anns analysis needed for a “garden
variety” claim.
Cheers
Barb